Vol. II—October, 1917—No. 4

Some Historical Errors of James Ford Rhodes

While on a visit to Cleveland, Ohio, some time ago, the guest of my good friend George A. Myers, my attention was called to Rhodes' History of the United States. This was due, no doubt, to the fact that Mr. Myers had been in correspondence with Mr. Rhodes relative to certain points in the career of the late M. A. Hanna, brought out by Mr. Rhodes, which, in the opinion of Mr. Myers, were not accurate. In glancing over one of the volumes, I came across the chapters giving information about what took place in the State of Mississippi during the period of Reconstruction. I detected so many statements and representations which to my own knowledge were absolutely groundless that I decided to read carefully the entire work. I regret to say that, so far as the Reconstruction period is concerned, it is not only inaccurate and unreliable but it is the most biased, partisan and prejudiced historical work I have ever read. In his preface to volume six, the author was frank enough to use the following language: "Nineteen years' almost exclusive devotion to the study of one period of American history has had the tendency to narrow my field of vision." Without doing the slightest violence to the truth, he could have appropriately added these words: "And since the sources of my information touching the Reconstruction[Pg 346] period were partial, partisan and prejudiced, my field of vision has not only been narrowed, but my mind has been poisoned, my judgment has been warped, my decisions and deductions have been biased and my opinions have been so influenced that my alleged facts have not only been exaggerated, but my comments, arguments, inferences and deductions based upon them, can have very little if any value for historical purposes."

Many of his alleged facts were so magnified and others so minimized as to make them harmonize with what the author thought the facts should be rather than what they actually were. In the first place, the very name of his work is a misnomer: "History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850 to the Final Restoration of Home Rule at the South in 1877." I have emphasized the words "to the final restoration of home rule at the South in 1877" because those are the words that constitute the misnomer. If home rule were finally restored to the South in 1877, the natural and necessary inference to be drawn is that prior to that time those States were subjected to some other kind of rule, presumably that of foreigners and strangers, an inference which is wholly at variance with the truth. Another inference to be drawn is that those States had enjoyed home rule until the same was revolutionized or set aside by the Reconstruction Acts of Congress and that it was finally restored in 1877. If this is the inference which the writer meant to have the reader make, it is conclusive evidence of the fact that he was unpardonably and inexcusably ignorant of the subject matter about which he wrote. As that term is usually and generally understood, there never was a time when those States did not have home rule, unless we except the brief period when they were under military control, and even then the military commanders utilized home material in making appointments to office. Since the officers, however, were not elected by the people, it may be plausibly claimed that they did not have home rule. But the State governments that were organized and brought into existence under the Reconstruction Acts of Congress were the first and only[Pg 347] governments that were genuinely republican in form. The form of government which existed in ante-bellum days was that of an aristocracy. That which has existed since what Mr. Rhodes is pleased to term the restoration of home rule is simply that of a local despotic oligarchy. The former was not, and the present is not, based upon the will and choice of the masses; but the former was by far the better of the two, for whatever may be truthfully said in condemnation and in derogation of the southern aristocracy of ante-bellum days, it can not be denied that they represented the wealth, the intelligence, the decency and the respectability of their respective States. While the State governments that were dominated by the aristocrats were not based upon the will of the people, as a whole, yet from an administrative point of view they were not necessarily bad. Such can not be said of those who are now the representatives of what Mr. Rhodes is pleased to term home rule.

On page 171 of his seventh volume, Mr. Rhodes says: "Some Southern men at first acted with the Republican party, but they gradually slipped away from it as the color line was drawn and reckless and corrupt financial legislation inaugurated." That thousands of white men in the South, who identified themselves with the Republican party between 1868 and 1876, subsequently left it, will not be denied, but the reasons for their action are not those given by Mr. Rhodes. In fact, there is no truth in the allegation about the drawing of the color line and very little in the one about corrupt or questionable financial legislation. The true reason why so many white men at the South left the Republican party may be stated under three heads: first, the Democratic victories of 1874 which were accepted by southern Democrats as a national repudiation of the congressional plan of Reconstruction; second, the closeness of the Presidential election of 1876 together with the supposed bargain entered into between the Hayes managers and southern Democratic members of Congress, by which the South was to be turned over to the Democrats of that section in consideration of which the said southern Democrats gave their consent[Pg 348] to the peaceable inauguration of Hayes; third, the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States by which the doctrine of States' Rights was given new life and strength.

It is true there are some men whose party affiliations are based upon principle and convictions regardless of consequences personal to themselves. Occasionally there are found some who are even willing to be martyrs, but they are exceptions to the general rule. The average man is politically ambitious. He desires political distinction and official recognition. In determining his party affiliations, therefore, he is more than apt to cast his lot with the party through which he believes that ambition may be gratified. After the consummation of the events above referred to, the conviction became settled in the minds of white men at the South that the Democratic party in that section would be, for a generation, at least, the only channel through which it would be possible for any one to have his political ambition realized. Hence, thousands of those who had previously joined the Republican party returned to the Democratic since that party presented the only hope of their future political salvation.

Mr. Rhodes would lead one to infer that the southern white men who came into the Republican party in the South between 1868 and 1876 were not among the most intelligent, cultivated, refined and representative men of that section. As a rule, they were men who belonged to, and were identified with, what was known as the "Southern aristocracy." Such men, for instance, as Ex-Governors Orr of South Carolina, Parsons of Alabama, Reynolds of Texas, and Brown of Georgia. Also such men as Mosby, Wickham, and subsequently Mahone, Massey, Paul, Fulkerson and Riddleberger, of Virginia. General R. E. Lee was known to have leanings in the same direction, but since he was not politically ambitious, his views were not made a matter of public discussion. In addition to Ex-Governor Brown of Georgia, they included such men as General Longstreet, Joshua Hill, Bullock and many others of like caliber. Even Ben Hill was suspected by some and accused by others of[Pg 349] leaning in the same direction. In Louisiana, not less than 25 per cent. of the best and most substantial white men of that State became identified with the Republican party under the leadership of such men as Ex-Governor Hahn and the Honorable Mr. Hunt (who was appointed Secretary of the Navy by President Garfield), Wells, Anderson and many others. General Beauregard was known, or at any rate believed, to be in sympathy with these men and the cause they represented, although he took no active part in politics. But it was in my own State of Mississippi, where I had an intimate knowledge of, and acquaintance with, the solid and substantial white men who identified themselves with the Republican party and whose leadership the newly enfranchised blacks faithfully followed. They included such men as James L. Alcorn, who was elected Governor of the State by the Republicans in 1869 and to the United States Senate by the legislature that was elected at the same time. Alcorn was one of the aristocrats of the past. He served with Mr. Lamar in the secession convention of 1861 and was a general in the Confederate Army.

Mr. Rhodes failed to inform his readers of the fact that the Democratic candidate for Governor against Alcorn, Judge Louis Dent, belonged to that much abused class called "carpet baggers," but who, like thousands of others of that class, both Democrats and Republicans, was a man of honor and integrity. The same was true of Tarbell, Powers, Pierce, McKee, Jeffords, Speed and others of the same type in both parties. In addition to Alcorn, there was Col. R. W. Flournoy, who also served with Mr. Lamar as a member of the secession convention and who was the Republican candidate for Congress against Mr. Lamar in 1872, also Judge Jason Niles, who served as a member of the State legislature, Judge of the Circuit Court and member of Congress. His able and brilliant son, Judge Henry Clay Niles, is now the United States District Judge for that State, having been appointed by President Harrison. He has the reputation of being one of the best and finest Judges[Pg 350] on the Federal Bench. The State never had before and has not had since, a finer judiciary than it had under the administrations of Alcorn, Powers and Ames, the three Republican Governors. In referring to the three justices of the State Supreme Court, Mr. Rhodes made the statement that eligible material in the Republican party was so scarce that, in order to get three competent judges the Governor was obliged to select a Democrat. This is not true. Chief Justice E. G. Peyton and Associate Justice H. F. Simrall were both southern Republicans. Justice Tarbell, though a so-called "carpet bagger," was also a Republican and an able judge, who enjoyed the confidence and respect of the bench and bar. When he retired from the bench he was made Second Comptroller of the United States Treasury.

In addition to these able and brilliant men, I feel justified in naming a few others, such as R. W. Millsaps, in whose honor one of the educational institutions at Jackson was named; W. M. Compton; T. W. Hunt; J. B. Deason; W. H. Vasser; Luke Lea, who was at one time United States District Attorney; his son, A. M. Lea, who subsequently held the same office; J. L. Morphis, who was one of the first Republicans elected to Congress; Judge Hiram Cassidy, who was the recognized leader of the bar in the southern part of the State; his able and brilliant son, Hiram Cassidy, Jr.; and his law partner, Hon. J. F. Sessions. Among the circuit and chancery court judges there were such jurists as Messrs. Chandler, Davis, Hancock, Walton, Smyley, Henderson, Hill, Osgood, Walker, Millsaps, McMillan, and Drane. Moreover, there were thousands of others, such as J. N. Carpenter and James Surget, men of character, wealth and intelligence, who had no ambition for official recognition or political distinction, but who were actuated by what they honestly believed to be conducive to the best interests of their country, their State and their section. In fact, the southern white men that came into the Republican party were typical representatives of the best blood and the finest manhood of the South, than whom no better men ever lived. And yet to read what Mr. Rhodes has written, one would naturally[Pg 351] assume that the opposite of this was true, that the Republican party in that section was under the domination of northern "carpet baggers," a few worthless southern whites and a number of dishonest and incompetent colored men. This, no doubt, is the false, deceptive and misleading picture which had been painted from the vividness of his partial, mistaken, prejudiced and diseased imagination.

That many mistakes were made during the progress of Reconstruction cannot and will not be denied. No friend and supporter of the congressional plan of Reconstruction will maintain that every thing was perfect. On the contrary, it is frankly admitted that quite a number of grave blunders were made; but they were not confined to any one party. Neither Republicans nor Democrats can justly lay claim to all that was good or truthfully charge the other with all that was bad. Of those who were selected as representatives of the two parties, the Democrats had, in point of experience and intelligence, a slight advantage over the Republicans; but in point of honesty and integrity the impartial historian will record the fact that the advantage was with the Republicans. How could either escape error? The Civil War had just come to a close; sectional animosity was bitter and intense. The Republican party was looked upon as the party of the North and, therefore, the bitter enemy of the South. The southern white men who joined the Republican party were accused of being traitors to their section and false to their own race and blood; they were called Scalawags. Through a process of intimidation, chiefly by means of social ostracism, independent thought and action on the part of southern whites, during the early period of Reconstruction, were pretty effectually prevented. Through such methods, they were quite successfully held under the subjection and control of those whose leadership they had been accustomed to follow.

Under such circumstances, the reader may ask the question, why was it and how was it that so many of the best white men of that section joined the Republican party? The answer is that, prior to the election of General Grant to the[Pg 352] presidency in 1868, very few of them did so. It was never a question of men. It was always a question of party. Under such circumstances, thousands of white men were obliged to vote for certain Democratic candidates who were otherwise objectionable as against certain Republicans who were otherwise acceptable. In like manner, thousands of colored men were obliged to vote for certain Republican candidates who were otherwise objectionable as against certain Democrats who were otherwise acceptable. The wonder, therefore, is, not that so many, but that so few mistakes were made; not that so many, but that so few objectionable persons were elected to important and responsible positions.

After the election of Grant, however, in 1868 the feeling of intolerance somewhat subsided, resulting in a large number of accessions to the Republican party from the ranks of the best and most substantial white men of that section. But it was not until the reelection of Grant in 1872 that the feeling of political proscription, social ostracism and intolerance among the whites seemingly disappeared. It was then that white men came into, took charge of and assumed the leadership of the Republican party, in large numbers. They then had nothing to fear and nothing to lose by being identified with the Republican party when social distinctions growing out of politics ceased to be effective. The South then entered upon a new era which was destined to bring to that section wealth and prosperity with happiness and contentment among its people of both races, all living under local governments successfully controlled by the better element of native whites with the cooperation and participation to some extent of the newly enfranchised blacks.

The writer of this article has always believed it to be a misfortune to his race and to the country, if conditions be such as to make it necessary for any race or group, of which our citizenship is composed, to act in a solid body with any one political party. The writer timely called attention to this in a speech which he delivered on the floor of the House of Representatives over thirty years ago. He then made an[Pg 353] appeal to the Democrats to change the attitude of their party towards the colored Americans. While the colored people, he said, were grateful to the Republican party for their physical emancipation, they would be equally grateful to the Democratic party for their political emancipation. While he was a Republican from choice, he personally knew of many members of his race who were Republicans, not from choice but from necessity, and that the Democratic party was responsible for the existence of that necessity. Upon economic questions there are differences of opinion among colored as well as white persons. It is an injustice to the colored race and a misfortune to the country, if they can not vote in accordance with their convictions upon such questions. No race or group can be true and independent American citizens, as all should be, when they are made to feel that the exercise and enjoyment by them of their civil and political rights are contingent upon the result of an election. It must be said to the credit of the late Grover Cleveland that he did all in his power both as Governor of New York and as President of the United States to bring about this necessary change and reform in his party. That his efforts were not crowned with success, was through no fault of his.

The newly enfranchised blacks at the South, as I have endeavored to show, had no other alternative than to act with the Republican party. That some objectionable persons should have been elected by them under such conditions, could not very well have been prevented. But the reader of Mr. Rhodes's history cannot fail to see that he believed it was a grave mistake to have given the colored men at the South the right to vote, and in order to make the alleged historical facts harmonize with his own views upon this point, he took particular pains to magnify the virtues and minimize the faults of the Democrats and to magnify the faults and minimize the virtues of the Republicans, the colored men especially. On page 97 of his fifth volume, for instance, Mr. Rhodes says: "But few Negroes were competent to perform the duties; for instance, it was said that the colored[Pg 354] man, who for four years was Sheriff of DeSoto County, could neither read nor write. The Negro incumbent generally farmed out his office to a white deputy for a share of the revenue."

The foregoing is one of the most barefaced and glaring misrepresentations that can possibly be made. The reader will notice that the allegation is based upon "it has been said." But if Mr. Rhodes had been anxious to record only what was accurate and true, he should have, as he easily could have done, found out just what the facts were, as I have done. The facts were these. When Tate County was created the greater part of the territory composing the new county had been taken from the county of DeSoto. The then sheriff of DeSoto County lived in that section which was made a part of the new county of Tate. It thus became necessary for a new sheriff to be appointed by the Governor for DeSoto County to hold office until the election of a sheriff at the next regular election. Rev. J. J. Evans, a colored Baptist minister and a Union soldier, was thereupon appointed. Since this took place in 1873, the appointment must have been made by Governor R. C. Powers, who had been elected Lieutenant Governor on the ticket with Alcorn in 1869 and had become Governor when Alcorn went to the United States Senate in 1871. Although he was one of those who belonged to that class called "carpet baggers," Governor Powers was known to be an honest and an upright man and one who exercised great care in all of his appointments. Governor Powers never could have been induced to appoint as sheriff of any county a man who could neither read nor write.

Mr. Evans discharged the duties of his position with such entire satisfaction that he was nominated by the Republicans and elected to succeed himself at the regular election in November, 1873, for the full term of two years. In 1875 he was renominated by his party to succeed himself. Mr. Evans's administration had been so satisfactory that when the Democratic county convention met to nominate a local ticket, no nomination was made for the office of[Pg 355] sheriff. But between the nomination and election the Democratic organization in the State saw a new light. It was decided that the State must be "redeemed," and that nearly all of the counties must be included in that redemption. The Democratic executive committee of DeSoto County was, therefore, directed to meet and complete the local ticket by nominating a candidate for sheriff. This was done, and the ticket as thus completed was, of course, declared elected and DeSoto County "redeemed."

It is a fact of which Mr. Rhodes may not be aware, that the county sheriff in Mississippi is also the county tax collector, and as such he is required to give a heavy bond. These bonds are usually given by property owners of the county, nearly all of whom are white men and Democrats. Had Mr. Evans been the man described by Mr. Rhodes, he never could have qualified for the office. It is also a fact of which Mr. Rhodes may not be aware, that the county sheriff in Mississippi as the chief executive and administrative officer of his county, is necessarily obliged, regardless of his own qualifications and fitness, to employ a number of assistants and deputies to aid him in running the office. The number of persons, with the salary or compensation of each, is fixed by law or the court and they are paid according to law out of money appropriated for that purpose. In making these appointments, it is both reasonable and natural that the appointing power would favorably consider a suggestion or recommendation from any one of the sureties. At any rate, Mr. Evans had the good sense to surround himself with honest, efficient and capable assistants. He is still living at Hernando, DeSoto County, Mississippi. As I write these lines, an autograph letter from him is before me. While it is clear that he is not a college graduate, his letter effectually disproves the allegation that he can neither read nor write. Moreover, even if his education is limited, this cannot be considered exceptional, for the sheriffs of many counties in the South today are illiterate and mentally undeveloped. I judge from the contents of Mr. Evans's letter that there is no truth in the allegation that he divided any[Pg 356] part of his own compensation with any one or more of his assistants. He left the office with a spotless record, every dollar of the public funds that passed through his hands, and for which he was liable, having been honestly and faithfully accounted for.

But even if Mr. Evans had been the man described by Mr. Rhodes, it would have been manifestly unfair and unjust to the colored voters of Mississippi to select him as a typical representative of those who were elected to important and responsible positions by the votes of colored men. Out of seventy-two counties of which the State was then composed, not more than twelve ever had colored sheriffs at any time, and they did not all hold office at the same time. Of those who were thus honored, the writer of these lines was personally acquainted with not less than ten. Mr. Evans was one of the few whom he did not then know personally. If Mr. Rhodes had desired to be fair and impartial, he would have taken all of them into consideration and would have drawn an average. But this would not have answered his purpose. It would have shown that in point of intelligence, capacity, and honesty the colored sheriffs would have favorably compared with the whites.

Take, for instance, the county of Adams-Natchez, my own home, where two colored men at different times held the office of sheriff. The first of the two was Wm. McCary, who was elected in 1873. He belonged to that small class known as free persons of color during the days of slavery. His father was the leading barber of Natchez for white business men and a private school teacher. He taught the children of those who were identified with his own class, of which there were quite a number, having privileges and advantages which were denied to the children of slaves. His own children, of course, were not neglected. Wm. McCary, therefore, had a good English education. He was also a property owner and a taxpayer. He was one of the two colored men who qualified as a surety on the bond of the writer of these lines when he was appointed a Justice of the Peace in 1869. Mr. McCary was held in high esteem by the[Pg 357] people of the city of Natchez and the county of Adams, both white and colored. Prior to his election to the office of sheriff he had served as a member of the board of aldermen for the city of Natchez and also as treasurer of the county of Adams, and subsequently as postmaster of Natchez, the duties of all of which he discharged with credit to himself and satisfaction to the public. In 1875 he was succeeded as sheriff by another colored man, Robert H. Wood, who in all important particulars was about on a par with McCary. Wood had previously served as mayor of Natchez, to which position he was elected by popular vote in December, 1870. He was serving the people of Natchez as their postmaster when he was elected to the office of sheriff.

These men not only gave satisfaction to the people whom they served, but they reflected credit upon themselves, their race, their party and the community that was so fortunate as to have the benefit of their services. What was true of these two men was also true in a large measure of Harney of Hinds, Scott of Issaquena, Sumner of Holmes, and several others. But, if Mr. Rhodes had desired to be impartial and preferred to select but one man as a typical representative of those who were elected to such positions by the votes of colored men, he would have selected B. K. Bruce, who was sheriff of Bolivar County when he was elected to the United States Senate. Mr. Bruce needs no introduction to intelligent and reading Americans. He developed into a national character. He reflected credit not only upon himself, his race and his party but his country as well. And yet he typified in a most remarkable degree the colored men who were elected to important and responsible positions chiefly by the votes of members of that race. But the reader of Rhodes's history will look in vain for anything that will give him accurate information along these lines. His history, therefore, is remarkable, not only for what it says, but for what it leaves unsaid. In fact, it is plain to the intelligent reader that he started out with preconceived notions as to what the facts were or should have been, and that he took particular pains to select such data and so[Pg 358] to color the same as to make them harmonize with his opinions. He thus passed over in silence all facts which could not be so distorted as to make them thus harmonize. He could find nothing that was creditable or meritorious in the career of any colored member of either house of Congress, notwithstanding the favorable impression made and the important and dignified service rendered by Revels and Bruce in the Senate and by Rainey, Rapier, Elliott, Smalls, Cain, Langston, Miller, Ohara, Cheatham, White and others in the House.[403]

But, to return to Mississippi, let us take up another error of Mr. Rhodes. Referring to the political and sanguinary revolution which took place in Mississippi in 1875, Mr. Rhodes makes use of these words: "Whilst regretting some of the means employed, all lovers of good government must rejoice at the redemption of Mississippi.... Since 1876 Mississippi has increased in population and in wealth; her bonded indebtedness and taxation are low."[404] It is difficult to conceive how an intelligent man, claiming to be an impartial recorder of historical events, could be induced to make such glaring statements as the above, when he ought to have known that just the opposite of what he affirms is true, except as to increase in population and in wealth. "All lovers of good government must rejoice at the redemption of Mississippi." Redemption from what? The reader is led to believe that the "redemption" is from bad to good government, from high to low taxes, from increased to decreased bonded indebtedness, from incompetent, inefficient and dishonest administration to one that was competent, efficient and honest.

Now let us see just what the facts were and are. In 1875 there was just one State officer to be elected, that of[Pg 359] State treasurer, to fill the vacancy caused by the death of George H. Holland, who was elected on the ticket with Ames in 1873. The Democrats nominated Hon. Wm. L. Hemingway, of Carroll County, whose nomination was favorably received. He had the reputation of being a capable, an honest and upright man. In addition to this, he was identified with that wing of his party which was known to be progressive, liberal and fair. In the early days of Reconstruction, the Democratic party in the State was sharply divided into two factions. One, the major faction, adopted what they termed a policy of "masterly inactivity," which meant that the white Democrats should take no part in the organization of a State government under the Reconstruction Acts of Congress, with a view of making the work of Reconstruction as odious, as objectionable and as unpopular as possible. The other faction believed it to be the duty of the white Democrats to take an active part in the formation of a State government, elect as many Democrats to the State Constitutional Convention of 1868 as possible with a view of framing a new constitution that would have very few if any objectionable clauses. Wm. L. Hemingway was one of that number, and as such he was elected to the convention from Carroll County. The nomination of Hemingway for State treasurer by the Democratic State Convention in 1875 was looked upon as a concession to that element of the party.

The Republicans did not fail to see that in order to carry the State they must nominate their strongest and best man, even if the election should be fair and honest, which they hoped would be the case, but which hope they had good reasons to apprehend would not be fully realized. Capt. George M. Buchanan, of Marshal County, was nominated. Buchanan had been a brave and gallant Confederate soldier. He had served as sheriff of Marshal County for a number of years. He was strong, able and popular. He was known to be the best fitted and best qualified man for the office of State treasurer. With a half-way decent election his triumph, even over so popular a man as Wm. L. Hemingway,[Pg 360] was an assured fact. The Democrats, however, had decided that the time had come for the State to be "redeemed," peaceably and fairly if possible, violently and unfairly if necessary. With George M. Buchanan as the Republican candidate, it was necessary to employ means which Mr. Rhodes so much regretted, but which he justifies because, as he understands it, they were employed in the interest of good government.

Was that true? Let us see. Buchanan, of course, was declared defeated and Hemingway declared elected. Mississippi was thus "redeemed, for which all lovers of good government must rejoice," but Mr. Rhodes failed to record the fact that this man who was the representative of the redemption of the State had been in office a comparatively brief period when the discovery was made that he was a defaulter to the amount of $315,612.19.[405] It would be a reflection upon Mr. Rhodes's intelligence to assume that he was ignorant of this important fact. Oh, no! he must have known about it, but to make any allusion to it would be out of harmony with the purposes he evidently had in view. It is safe to assume that, if the will of a majority of the legal voters of the State had not been violently suppressed in the interest of good and honest government, which would have resulted in the election of honest George M. Buchanan, while the State would not have been redeemed, it would have been saved from the loss of $315,612.19. The writer of these lines has never believed that Hemingway was the personal beneficiary of this money or any part thereof, but that he was the instrument in the hands of others. Still he was the official representative of the redemption of the State for which "all lovers of good government must rejoice."

That there was a material increase in the population and in the wealth of the State will not be denied. These results would have followed, even if the State had never been redeemed. They were not due to redemption but in spite of it. In fact, there was a marked increase in population and in wealth before as well as subsequent to the redemption.[Pg 361] But when the author states that the bonded indebtedness and taxation are low, the impression necessarily made, and intended to be made upon the mind of the reader, is that after the redemption took place and as a result thereof, the rate of taxation was reduced, the volume of money paid into the State treasury annually for the support of the government was less than it had been before, and that there had been a material reduction in the bonded debt of the State, neither of which is true.[406] If Mr. Rhodes had been disposed to record the truth and nothing but the truth, which is presumed to be the aim of an impartial historian, he could have easily obtained the facts, because they are matters of record. To give the reader an idea of what the facts were and are, I will take, for purposes of comparison, one year prior and one subsequent to the redemption of the State. In 1875, the year that the redemption took place, the assessed value of taxable property was $119,313,834. The receipts from all sources that year amounted to $1,801,129.12. Disbursements for the same year, $1,430,192.83. In 1907 the assessed value of taxable property was reported to be $373,584,960. Receipts from all sources, same year, $3,391,127.15. Disbursements, same year, $3,730,343.29. The above figures speak for themselves. They are from the official records, the accuracy of which cannot be questioned.[407] The records show too that during the administration of Governor Ames, which was about half over when the redemption took place, the rate of taxation had been reduced from seven mills to four mills and that a material reduction had been made in the bonded debt of the State and that after the redemption took place the tax rate was increased from four mills to six mills and that by 1907 $732,890.74 had been added to the bonded debt of the State. And yet in the opinion of Mr. Rhodes, these are conditions for the deliverance from which the employment of regrettable means was necessary, at which, however, "all lovers of good government should rejoice," since their employment resulted in the redemption of the State.[Pg 362]

But another evidence of Mr. Rhodes's careless and reckless manner of stating alleged historical facts will be found in a paragraph on page 132 of his seventh volume. In speaking of Governor Ames's unsuccessful efforts to have troops sent to the State to assist in maintaining order and insuring a fair and peaceable election, he says: "A number of the white Republicans of Mississippi who had quarrelled or differed with Ames, among whom were both the United States senators, used their influence against the sending of federal troops to Mississippi and none were sent." The two United States Senators at that time were J.L. Alcorn and B.K. Bruce. Bruce was a strong friend and loyal supporter of Ames and did all in his power to have Ames's request granted. This statement is based upon my own knowledge. Senator Alcorn was one of the few white Republicans who had quarrelled with Ames. In fact, he ran as an Independent for governor against Ames in 1873. But he was a Republican United States Senator and as such he had no sympathy with the Democratic party. My relations with both senators were cordial. If Alcorn had used his influence to prevent having federal troops sent to the State, I am sure I would have known it. If he raised his voice or used his pen for such purpose, that fact was never brought to my notice and I am satisfied it was never done. My own opinion is that he remained reticent and refused to take sides. The true reason why troops were not sent in compliance with the request of Governor Ames was that, although the President once directed that the requisition be complied with, he later rescinded the order when informed by Republicans from Ohio that such interference would cause the loss of Ohio to the Republicans at the October election and would not save Mississippi.[408]

Referring to the Reconstruction policy, Mr. Rhodes says: "Stevens' Reconstruction Acts, ostensibly in the interest of freedom, were an attack on civilization.[409] In my judgment Sumner did not show wise constructive statesmanship[Pg 363] in forcing unqualified Negro Suffrage on the South."[410] The truth is that Stevens and Sumner were wiser than their day and generation. They were not favorable to an immediate restoration of the States lately in rebellion upon any conditions. They knew that after the cessation of hostilities, the flower of the Confederate Army, an army which it took the entire North with all of its numbers, immense wealth and almost limitless resources four years to conquer, would be at the South and that upon the completion of Reconstruction and the withdrawal of the federal troops, that army could be utilized to bring about practically the same conditions that existed before the war. They, therefore, opposed immediate restoration. This is what Mr. Rhodes characterizes as an attack on civilization. To what civilization does he refer? He surely could not have had in mind the civilization which believed in the divine right of slavery and which recognized and sanctioned the right of one man to hold another as his property; and yet this was the only civilization upon which the rebuilding of the rebellious governments was an attack. But for the adoption of the Congressional plan of Reconstruction and the subsequent legislation of the nation along the same line, the abolition of slavery through the ratification of the 13th Amendment would have been in name only, a legal and constitutional myth. This is the civilization, however, an attack upon which Mr. Rhodes so deeply deplores. It is fortunate for the country that a majority of Mr. Rhodes's fellow citizens did not and do not agree with him along these lines.

Since Stevens and Sumner could not secure the adoption of the plan advocated by them, they proceeded to secure the adoption of the best one that it was possible to obtain under conditions as they then existed. Hence they insisted, successfully, as was then believed, that the legislation, including the 14th Amendment, should be so framed as not only to create national citizenship, as distinguished from State citizenship, but that it should be made the duty of the Federal Government to protect its own citizens, when necessary,[Pg 364] against domestic violence, to protect its citizens at home as well as when they are abroad. The closing clause of the 14th Amendment, therefore, declares that Congress shall have power to enforce the provisions of the amendment by appropriate legislation.

But Mr. Rhodes says the Congressional plan of Reconstruction was a failure. The defeat of the Republican party at the North, especially in 1874, he believes "was due to the failure of the Southern policy of the Republican party." In speaking of the action of President Hayes, he says: "Indeed it was the final admission of the Republican party that their policy of forcing Negro suffrage upon the South was a failure." Is it true that Reconstruction was a failure? That depends upon the view one takes of it. Admitting that some of the things expected of it by many of its friends and supporters were not fully realized, its failure even to that extent was, in a large measure, one of the results but not one of the contributory causes of the Democratic national victory of 1874. On the contrary, that policy was a grand and brilliant success.

In the first place, when the split between Congress and President Johnson took place, there was soon developed the fact that the enfranchisement of the blacks was the only plan which could be adopted and by which the one advocated by the President could be defeated. It had been seen and frankly admitted that the war for the preservation of the Union could not have been brought to a successful conclusion without putting the musket in the hands of the loyal blacks. The fact was now made plain that the fruits of the victory that had been won on the battlefield could not be preserved without putting the ballot in their hands. Hence, it was done.

Was this a mistake? Mr. Rhodes says it was; but the results prove that it was not. But for the enfranchisement of the blacks at the South at the time and in the way it was done the 14th and subsequently the 15th Amendment to the Federal Constitution never could have been ratified. The ratification of these two measures alone vindicated the[Pg 365] wisdom of that legislation. The 14th Amendment, among other things, made the colored people American citizens. It was, in effect, a recall of the famous Dred Scott decision. The 15th Amendment gave the colored American access to the ballot box, in every State in the Union. The fundamental principles that were carried into effect through the Reconstruction acts of Congress were embodied in these two amendments. After the ratification of these measures, what had previously been local to the South became national. No State north, south, east or west can now legally and constitutionally make or enforce any law making race or color the basis of discrimination in the exercise and enjoyment of civil and public rights and privileges, nor can it make race or color the basis of discrimination in prescribing the qualification of electors. By the ratification of those amendments the right of an American citizen to the exercise and enjoyment of civil and political rights and the right to vote ceased to be local and became national. But it is claimed by some that because the 15th Amendment has been successfully evaded in certain States, it is, for that reason, a failure. I will state here in passing, however, that there has never been made nor can be made any law or constitution that can not at certain times and in some places be successfully evaded. But this does not necessarily prove that the law or constitution in question was a mistake and should, for that reason, be repealed. To this extent and for the reasons and purposes above stated, the wisdom of the Reconstruction Acts of Congress has been more than vindicated.

The failure of the Reconstruction legislation was not due so much to the change of sentiment in the North as to an unwise interpretation of these laws. This started with two unfortunate decisions rendered by the United States Supreme Court, the result of two unwise appointments to seats on the bench made by President Grant. The Judges referred to are Waite of Ohio, and Bradley of New Jersey. Both were supposed to be Republicans and believed to be in[Pg 366] accord with the other leaders and constitutional lawyers in the Republican party in their construction of the War Amendments to the Federal Constitution. But they proved to be strong States' Rights men and, therefore, strict constructionists. Those two, with the other States' Rights men already on the bench, constituted a majority of that tribunal. The result was that the court declared unconstitutional and void, not only the national civil rights act, but also the principal sections of the different enforcement acts which provided for the protection of individual citizens by the Federal Government against domestic violence. National citizenship had been created by the 14th Amendment and the Federal Government had been clothed with power to enforce the provisions of that amendment. Legislation for that purpose had been placed upon the statute books and they were being enforced whenever and wherever necessary, as in the case of the lawless and criminal organization called the Ku Klux Klan. But the Supreme Court, very much to the surprise of every one, stepped in and tied the hands of the national administration and prevented any further prosecutions for violence upon the person of a citizen of the United States, if committed within the limits of any one of the States of the Union. In other words, if the State in which a citizen of the United States may reside can not, does not or will not protect him in the exercise and enjoyment of his personal, civil and political rights, he is without a remedy. The result is that the Federal Government is placed in the awkward and anomalous position of exacting support and allegiance from its citizens, to whom it can not in return afford protection, unless they should be outside the boundaries of their own country. By those unfortunate and fatal decisions the vicious and mischievous doctrine of States' Rights, called by some State sovereignty, by others local self government, which was believed to have perished upon the battlefields of the country, was given new life, strength and audacity, and fostered by the preaching of the fear of "Negro domination." The decision declaring[Pg 367] the Civil Rights Law unconstitutional was rendered by Mr. Justice Bradley, and nearly all of those by which the principal sections of the different enforcement laws were nullified, were rendered by Chief Justice Waite.

If in every southern State today no attempt were made to violate or evade the 15th Amendment and colored men were allowed free and unrestricted access to the ballot boxes and their votes were fairly and honestly counted, there would be no more danger of "Negro domination" in any one of these States than there is of female domination in States where women have the right to vote. All that colored men have ever insisted upon, was not to dominate but to participate, not to rule but to have a voice in the selection of those who are to rule. In view of their numerical strength the probabilities are that more of them would be officially recognized than in other sections of the country, but never out of proportion to their fitness and capacity, unless there should be a repetition of conditions that existed in the early days of Reconstruction, which is improbable. The dominant element in the Democratic party in that section at that time adopted, as stated above, the policy of "masterly inactivity" which was intended to prevent white men, through intimidation, from taking any part in the organization and reconstruction of the State governments, with a view of making the governments thus organized as odious and as objectionable as possible, in other words, to make them as far as possible "Negro governments." This policy proved to be somewhat effective in many localities. The result was the colored men found much difficulty in finding desirable white men outside of the Democratic party for the different local positions to be filled. This made it necessary in some instances for colored men to be selected to fill certain positions for which white men would have been chosen. But under the present order of things, a repetition of any thing of this sort would be wholly out of the question.

I can not close this article without giving expression to the hope that a fair, just and impartial historian will, some[Pg 368] day, write a history covering the Reconstruction period, in which an accurate account based upon actual facts of what took place at that time will be given, instead of a compilation and condensation of untrue, unreliable and grossly exaggerated statements taken from political campaign literature.

John R. Lynch,

Author of "The Facts of Reconstruction."

4352 Forrestville Avenue,
Chicago, Illinois

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